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Abstract—Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are part of most
critical infrastructures such as industrial automation and trans-
portation systems. Thus, security incidents targeting CPSs can
have disruptive consequences to assets and people. As prior
incidents tend to re-occur, sharing knowledge about these in-
cidents can help organizations be more prepared to prevent,
mitigate or investigate future incidents. This paper proposes
a novel approach to enable representation and sharing of
knowledge about CPS incidents across different organizations.
To support sharing, we represent incident knowledge (incident
patterns) capturing incident characteristics that can manifest
again, such as incident activities or vulnerabilities exploited by
offenders. Incident patterns are a more abstract representation
of specific incident instances and, thus, are general enough to
be applicable to various systems - different than the one in
which the incident occurred. They can also avoid disclosing
potentially sensitive information about an organization’s assets
and resources. We provide an automated technique to extract an
incident pattern from a specific incident instance. To understand
how an incident pattern can manifest again in other cyber-
physical systems, we also provide an automated technique to
instantiate incident patterns to specific systems. We demonstrate
the feasibility of our approach in the application domain of smart
buildings. We evaluate correctness, scalability, and performance
using two substantive scenarios inspired by real-world systems
and incidents.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems, Incidents
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) combine computation,
communication, and physical processes [1] to augment phys-
ical systems with enhanced capabilities, such as real-time
monitoring and dynamic control. Nowadays applications of
CPS can be found in a multitude of domains such as industrial
control systems, transportation systems and smart buildings.
Thus, security incidents targeting CPSs can have disruptive
consequences to their users and the assets they manage.
CPSs enable complex interactions between cyber and physi-
cal components. For example, in a smart building, a rise in the
measured temperature of a room can trigger a digital process
to issue a command to an air conditioner to start cooling the
room. Interactions between cyber and physical components
can extend the attack surface of a CPS, giving malicious in-
dividuals more opportunities to cause harm since they can ex-
ploit vulnerabilities from either component to impact the other.
Thus, the number of security incidents targeting CPSs has
increased over the past years [2]. For example, in the Ukrainian
Place acknowledgements here.
power grid incident [3], offenders used spear phishing to gain
a foothold in the distribution companies’ computer network.
Then, they gained access to the power grid network, to infect
and disable some physical devices (e.g., workstations, serial-
to-Ethernet) that control the electricity distribution, causing
disruption to the normal operation of the grid. Previously,
in the German steel-mill incident [4], offenders used spear
phishing to gain a foothold in the corporate network, and then
gain access to the plants network in order to shutdown the
blast furnace and the alarm system.
Some aspects of prior incidents often tend to re-occur. For
example, in the Ukrainian power grid incident an offender
obtained access to a private network using spear phishing. A
similar activity also happened in the German steel-mill inci-
dent. Thus, sharing knowledge about prior security incidents
can help organizations being more prepared to prevent, miti-
gate, or investigate future incidents [5]. However, supporting
information sharing about security incidents is still a key open
challenge [6], [7]. Besides, knowledge about security incidents
targeting CPSs is limited.
In this paper we propose a novel approach to enable repre-
sentation and sharing of incident knowledge across different
organizations. To enable sharing, we represent incident knowl-
edge (incident patterns) capturing incident characteristics that
can manifest again, such as incident activities or vulnerabilities
exploited by offenders. Incident patterns are a more abstract
representation of specific incident instances. Thus they are
general enough to be applicable to various systems - different
than the one in which the incident occurred. They can also
avoid disclosing potentially sensitive information about an
organization’s assets and resources (e.g., physical structure
of a building or vulnerable devices). As incident activities
can target or exploit system components, we also provide
a representation of the system where an incident occurs.
This includes cyber and physical components, their structure,
dependencies and dynamic behavior. We provide two meta-
models to represent incidents and cyber-physical systems,
respectively.
We propose an automated technique to extract an inci-
dent pattern from a specific incident instance. The extraction
technique explores inheritance hierarchy in the cyber-physical
system meta-model to abstract specific system characteristics
described in the incident instance. To understand how an
incident pattern can manifest again in other CPSs, we propose
an automated technique to instantiate incident patterns to
different systems. The instantiation technique uses a repre-
ar
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2sentation of the dynamic behavior of the system - expressed
as a labeled transition system - to identify the behavior traces
matching the activities in the incident pattern. We demonstrate
the feasibility of our approach in the application domain
of smart buildings. We evaluate correctness, scalability, and
performance using two substantive scenarios inspired by real-
world systems and incidents.
The novelty of our work lies in the combination of three
key elements:
• Incident patterns to support representation and sharing of
incident knowledge across different organizations.
• Automated technique to extract an incident pattern from
a specific incident instance in order to facilitate sharing
of incident knowledge and avoid disclosing sensitive
information about an organization’s assets and resources.
• Automated technique to instantiate an incident pattern
to specific cyber-physical systems in order to facilitate
assessment about whether and how prior incidents can
manifest again.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we motivate the need to share information about
incidents in CPSs. In Section III, we provide an overview of
our approach to share incident knowledge. In section IV, we
present, respectively, our system and incident meta-models.
In Section V, we describe the incident pattern extraction
technique. In Section VI, we illustrate the incident pattern
instantiation technique. In Section VII, we present an eval-
uation of both techniques, and discuss the results and threats
to validity. In section VIII, we compare our approach with
related work. Finally, in Section IX, we conclude and present
future work.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Our motivating example is centered on the ACME com-
pany that operates across three different smart buildings: a
Research Center, a Warehouse, and a Manufacturing Plant.
This is depicted in Fig. 1. The plan of the 2nd floor of the
Research Center consists of a Server Room, a Control Room,
and a Toilet. The Server Room contains a Fire Alarm, an
air conditioning unit (HVAC), and some Servers, while the
Control Room contains a Workstation. The whole building
is equipped with Smart Lights. The HVAC, the Fire Alarm
and the Smart Lights communicate with the Workstation
through the Installation Bus network, which adopts the KNX
protocol [8].
Unfortunately, an incident occurred in the Research Center.
An offender reached the 2nd floor, entered the Toilet, and
connected to the Smart Light (SL1) using a Laptop. After
that, s/he obtained access to the Installation Bus and was
able to collect data transmitted over the network (e.g., data
exchanged between the Workstation and the HVAC). This was
possible because messages exchanged through the installation
bus are not encrypted [9]. The offender then sent a targeted
Malware (e.g., exploiting the vulnerabilities present in Trane
HVACs [10]) to disable the HVAC, subsequently causing the
Servers to heat up. The incident actions are listed at the bottom
of Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: The ACME Company Motivating Example.
Upon the discovery of the incident, security administra-
tors wrote a report describing how the incident occurred.
Afterwards, to assess whether similar incidents activities can
manifest in the other buildings, security administrators have to
identify existing vulnerabilities brought by cyber and physical
components in those buildings. This may require to examine
the physical structure of each building, as well as the software
and network configurations of the digital devices within the
buildings.
However, security administrators face the following chal-
lenges. First, the approach each organization follows to per-
form incident reporting is not standardized [11]. Although
different templates (e.g., [12]) have been proposed to identify
what type of information incident reports should contain,
the description of an incident is usually provided in natural
language [13]. Understanding how an incident can re-occur
in a different system is arduous because it would require
a security administrator to examine the incident description
manually and speculate on all possible ways in which incidents
activities can be performed. Second, incident reports may
not represent incident activities in CPSs, which can exploit
vulnerabilities and dependencies between cyber and physical
components. Finally, incident reports may contain sensitive
information (e.g., internal network structure) that cannot be
disclosed to third parties [11].
Therefore, it is necessary to provide an approach to repre-
sent incidents in a more structured form, which can capture
activities that can use cyber and physical components. More-
over, it is necessary to provide a modeling technique that could
allow representing incident information in an abstract form
which avoids disclosing specific sensitive information about
the system in which the incident occurred. Finally, automated
techniques should be provided to analyze incident knowledge
and assess whether and how prior incidents can re-occur.
3III. SHARING INCIDENT KNOWLEDGE
To address the challenges highlighted in the previous sec-
tion, we propose our approach to share incident knowledge
across different systems and organizations. Our approach
provides representations of incidents and the cyber-physical
systems in which they can occur. It also provides two auto-
mated techniques. One technique extracts potential incident
patterns from specific incidents. The other technique instanti-
ates incident patterns in CPSs in order to assess whether and
how an incident can reoccur. Our approach is shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2: Our approach for sharing incident knowledge
After an incident occurs a security administrator operating
within an organization (A) can represent (1) the activities
of an incident (incident instance). These activities refer to
specific cyber and physical system components (e.g., SL1 or
Bus Network of the ACME Research Centre). Subsequently,
an incident pattern can be extracted (2) from an incident
instance automatically. An incident pattern includes activities
that refer to a more abstract representation of cyber-physical
system components. For example, activity Enter Toilet in the
incident instance can be abstracted to Enter Target Room in the
incident pattern. This avoids disclosing specific information
indicating, for example, location of smart devices exploited in
the incident. Differently from the traditional notion of pattern,
in this paper an incident pattern is extracted from a single
incident instance. However, an incident pattern can potentially
be instantiated in various ways in different systems.
The incident pattern is subsequently stored (3) in a shared
repository. Each time the repository is updated, a set of
subscribed organizations is notified. They can access incident
patterns and instantiate (4) them automatically w.r.t a set of
specific CPSs they manage. This allows system administrators
to assess all possible ways in which incident patterns can re-
occur again in those CPSs. For example, the incident pattern
extracted from the Research Center incident can be instantiated
to another organization’s CPS (e.g., CPS1 managed by organi-
zation B). Incident activity Connect to Network in the incident
pattern is instantiated to 2 subsequent activities Connect to
Workstation and Connect to Bus Network.
In our previous work [14], we briefly introduced our ap-
proach for sharing incident knowledge and provided a prelimi-
nary description of the models adopted to represent an incident
and the cyber-physical system in which it can occur. In this
paper, we extend our previous work, by describing in more
detail our models and how they can be used to represent cyber-
physical systems, incident instances and patterns. Differently
from our previous work, in this paper we also provide two
automated techniques to support extraction and instantiation
of incident patterns, respectively. Finally we evaluate our
techniques on a substantive, large-scale example.
IV. MODELING SYSTEMS & INCIDENTS
To model incidents in cyber-physical systems, we provide
two meta-models. First, a cyber-physical system meta-model
represents CPSs where an incident can occur, focusing on
their components, structure and dynamic behavior. Second,
an incident meta-model is proposed to represent incident
patterns and instances. The full meta-models are implemented
as Eclipse plugins that are available publicly1.
A. Modeling Cyber-Physical Systems
We tailor our system meta-model to represent smart build-
ings, which are a specific application domain of CPSs. So far
the analysis of security incidents in smart buildings [9] has
received little attention and this has motivated our focus on
this domain.
A simplified version of the smart building meta-model is
shown in Fig. 3. Note that this meta-model can be extended
to represent other time-discrete CPSs in domains different than
smart buildings. Our meta-model includes Assets, which can
represent physical and cyber components in a smart building.
Each Asset instance is identified by its name. PhysicalAssets
represent any physical component, such as Actor, Physical-
Structure, and ComputingDevice. Actor can be a person in
the smart building such as a Visitor or an Employee. Physical-
Structure represents part of the smart building physical layout,
which includes Room and Floor. ComputingDevice represents
any computing device, such as Laptop, FireAlarm, SmartLight,
Server, HVAC, and Workstation. DigitalAssets represent any
digital data that can be processed or software that can be
installed in a digital device inside the smart building. A
DigitalAsset can also represent a network (e.g., BusNetwork)
installed in the smart building.
An instance of the smart building meta-model representing
the Research Centre of the ACME Company is shown in
Fig. 4. For example, sl1 and toilet are instances of SmartLight
and Room, respectively.
To model the structure of a CPS, the meta-model also repre-
sents containment and connectivity relations between compo-
nents. The containedAssets relation denotes the Asset(s) con-
tained in a PhysicalAsset. The containedDigitalAssets relation
denotes the DigitalAsset(s) contained in another DigitalAsset.
For example, as shown in Fig. 4, sl1 is contained in the toilet,
sl2 and the workstation are contained in the controlRoom, and
1https://tinyurl.com/yd9k6zhe
4Fig. 3: Smart Building meta-model (simplified).
sl3, the fireAlarm, the server and the hvac are contained in the
serverRoom. Connection represents connectivity between two
components (asset1 and asset2) and can be described by a type
(e.g., wired). Digital connectivity between assets (e.g., through
a network) is expressed as a DigitalConnection, while physical
connectivity between assets (e.g., two rooms are connected
through a door) is expressed as a PhysicalConnection. For
example, as shown in Fig. 4, the toilet and the serverRoom
are connected physically to the hallway, while sl1-sl3, the
fireAlarm and the workstation are connected physically to the
busNetwork. The workstation is also connected digitally to the
hvac and the fireAlarm, to which it sends control commands.
Fig. 4: Research Center instance (simplified).
To specify the dynamic behaviour of a CPS, the meta-
model allows representing Actions. For example, Actions can
represent a person entering a room or connecting his/her laptop
to a computing device via the bus network. An Action is
expressed as a re-writing rule where a portion of the system
matching a pre-condition is re-written with the sub-system
represented in the post-condition. Pre- and post-conditions are
expressed using a custom notation inspired by Bigraphical
Reactive Systems (BRS) [15], which allows representing cyber
and physical components and their connectivity and contain-
ment relationships.
Table I represents pre- and post-conditions of actions “en-
ter Room”, “connect Laptop to BusNetwork physically”, and
“connect Laptop to ComputingDevice via BusNetwork”.
TABLE I: Pre- & post-conditions of some actions of the smart
building example.
enter Room
pre: (Room1{phys} ·Actor) | (Room2{phys})
post:Room1{phys} | (Room2{phys} ·Actor)
connect Laptop (Lap) to BusNetwork (Bus) physically
pre: ((Actor · Lap) | Dev{phys}) || Bus{phys}
post:((Actor · Lap{phys}) | Dev) || Bus{phys}
connect Laptop to ComputingDevice (Dev) via BusNetwork
pre: Actor · Lap{phys} || Bus{phys} || Dev{phys, dig}
post:Actor · Lap{phys, dig} || Bus{phys} || Dev{phys, dig}
The precondition of Action “enter Room” means that two
different rooms (Room1 and Room2) are connected physically
({phys}) and are contained in the same physical structure (see
operator ’|’), for example, the same floor. An Actor is inside
Room1 (see operator ’.’). As a result of Action “enter Room”,
the Actor who was previously contained in Room1 is now
inside Room2.
Action “connect Laptop to BusNetwork physically” indi-
cates that an actor establishes a physical connection of a laptop
to a bus network by replacing a computing device, which
was previously connected to the bus network. As indicated
in the pre-condition, an Actor who carries a laptop (Lap)
(see operator ’.’) is initially co-located (’|’) with a computing
device (Dev). This device is in turn connected physically
({phys}) to the bus network (Bus). Also Actor and Dev
are not necessarily contained in the same location as Bus
(see operator ’||’). In the post-condition Lap is connected
physically to Bus, replacing Dev.
Action “connect Laptop to ComputingDevice via BusNet-
work” indicates that an actor connects a laptop digitally
to a computing device through the bus network. The pre-
condition indicates that an Actor carries a laptop (Lap) (see
operator ’.’). The laptop (Lap) and the computing device
(Dev) are connected physically ({phys}) to a bus network
(Bus). The post-condition indicates that Lap establishes a
digital connection (dig) with Dev. Note that Actor, Bus
and Dev are not necessarily contained in the same physical
structure (see operator ’||’).
CPS components can be defined at different levels of ab-
straction in the meta-model. Level 3 includes concrete entities,
while Levels 1 and 2 include more abstract entities. A CPS,
such as the one represented in Fig. 4, is described by instances
of the most concrete entities of the smart building meta-model
(i.e. those in Level 3 in Fig. 3).
5Fig. 5: Incident meta-model (simplified).
B. Modeling Incidents
We take inspiration from Crime Scripts to model security
incidents. Crime Scripts are used in criminology to describe
the sequence of activities of physical crimes [16]. Despite
their adoption for understanding the incident commission
process and identifying incident prevention techniques, there
exists no model that can be used to represent and process
a Crime Script systematically. Thus, we have developed a
meta-model that captures the characteristics of Crime Scripts.
To represent incidents that occur in CPSs our meta-model
extends the original use of Crime Scripts to refer to cyber
components of the system explicitly. Our meta-model can be
used to represent incident instances and incident patterns. An
incident instance represents an incident that has occurred or
may occur in a specific CPS, such as the Research Center
in our motivating example. Therefore incident instances can
only refer to concrete CPS entities. An incident pattern is a
more abstract representation of an incident, which can occur in
various CPSs sharing common characteristics. Thus, incident
patterns can only refer to entity types (classes) of the CPS
meta-model.
A simplified version of the incident meta-model is shown
in Fig. 5. A CrimeScript entity is characterized by a name
and a category. A category indicates whether the incident
model represents an incident INSTANCE or a PATTERN. A
CrimeScript includes a set of partially ordered Scenes, which
represent the phases of a security incident (e.g., preparation
and execution scenes). Each scene, in turn, includes a set of
Activities. An Activity is characterized by a name and is linked
to the next subsequent activities in chronological order.
An IncidentEntity represents any entity that can be relevant
to an incident, such as an offender or an asset, and it is
characterized by a unique name and a type. An IncidentEntity
can —not necessarily— play different roles in an Activity. It
can be a Resource, a Target, an ActivityInitiator, or a Location.
A Target represents a component that can be harmed during an
incident. It is characterized by a status (e.g., open, connected),
and a model (e.g., Windows 10). A Resource represents a
component needed to perform an activity, such as a laptop or
a malware, and is also characterized by a model. An Activity
can be performed by an ActivityInitiator who may have a
role (e.g., offender, victim). A Location represents a place
where an activity or a sequence of activities of a scene is
performed. A Location can be physical or digital, depending
on the IncidentEntity it refers to. A physical location represents
a place in the physical space (e.g., a Room). A digital location
represents a place in the cyberspace, such as an IP address or
a digital folder. A Location’s port defines an access point to
the location (e.g., a door for a physical location or port 80 for
a digital location). An IncidentEntity can contain other entities
through relation containedEntities; the containing entity —if
present— is represented through relation parentEntity. A Con-
nection represents a physical or digital connectivity relation
between two IncidentEntity objects.
An incident activity is also characterized by a pre- and
a post-condition. Similarly to actions in the system meta-
model, pre- and post-conditions are represented as re-writing
rules. However, the subsystem represented in the pre- and
post-conditions is expressed by referring directly to incident
entities and their connectivity and containment relationships.
More precisely, a Condition refers to a set of incident entities
(IncidentEntityRef ). An IncidentEntityRef is characterized by
the name of the IncidentEntity it refers to, as well as some of
the incident entities it contains (containment). An IncidentEn-
tityRef can also refer to a set of connections (ConnectionRef ),
where the referred incident entity is involved. A ConnectionRef
refers to a Connection using its name. In the rest of this section
we describe how to use the incident meta-model to represent
incident instances and patterns.
1) Modeling Incident Instances: When the incident meta-
model is used to represent an incident instance, a target, a
resource, an activity initiator, and a location refer to specific
system components and actors in a cyber-physical system.
Thus, in an incident instance model, the name and type of
incident entities refer respectively to the name (e.g., sl1) and
the class (e.g., SmartLight) of a specific system component.
Containment and connectivity relationships between incident
entities can refer to containment and connectivity relationships
between the corresponding system components in the cyber-
physical system.
The incident instance model of the Research Center incident
is depicted in Fig. 6. We only show details of two of the in-
cident activities (“enter toilet” and “connect laptop to hvac”).
Activity “enter toilet” has a visitor as an ActivityInitiator, who
has the role of an offender. This Activity happens in room
hallway (Location) and targets room toilet (Target). As shown
in the model of the research centre in Fig 4, the toilet also
contains a smart light (sl1), which is connected physically to
the bus network. Activity “connect laptop to hvac” aims to
establish digital connectivity between a laptop and an hvac. It
is still performed by the visitor inside the toilet. It targets the
hvac and uses the laptop as a resource to establish connectivity.
As shown in the model of the research centre in Fig 4, the
hvac is connected physically to the bus network.
An activity in an incident instance has a direct mapping
to an action in the model of the cyber-physical system. Pre-
and post-conditions of an activity are the same as pre-and
post-conditions of the corresponding action but component
6Fig. 6: Incident instance model of the Research Center incident.
Fig. 7: A potential incident pattern model extracted from the incident instance model.
types are replaced with concrete component instances from
the system. Containment, physical and digital connectivity
relations expressed in the pre- and post-conditions of an action
are also replaced with concrete relations expressed in the
CPS model. For example, as shown in the upper part of
Fig. 8, activity “connect laptop to busNetwork” is associ-
ated with action “connect Laptop to BusNetwork physically”,
which is specified in Table I. Room, Actor, Lap, Dev and
Bus are replaced by toilet, visitor,laptop, smart light sl1,
and busNetwork, respectively. Physical connectivity {phys}
is replaced by physBus, i.e. the physical connectivity between
the busNetwork and sl1. Activity “connect laptop to hvac” is
created based on action “connect Laptop to ComputingDevice
via BusNetwork” specified in Table I. Lap, Dev and Bus
are replaced by laptop, hvac, and busNetwork, respectively.
Physical connectivity {phys} is replaced by physBus, i.e. the
physical connectivity between the busNetwork and the hvac,
while {dig} is replaced by a new digital connectivity between
the laptop and the hvac, which is created as an effect of the
action. If the incident instance uses an activity that does not
have any corresponding action in the system model, it will be
first necessary to create a new action in the system model to
which the activity can be associated.
2) Modeling Incident Patterns: When an incident pattern
is represented, a target, a resource, an activity initiator, and a
location can only refer to abstract system components that
can match more than one concrete component in a cyber-
physical system. Thus, in an incident pattern model the name
of incident entities is just a random unique name (e.g.,
“compDev”), and the type refers to an entity type in the smart
building meta-model (e.g., ComputingDevice).
A potential incident pattern model can be extracted from
the incident instance model shown in Fig. 6. Such an incident
pattern model is shown in Fig. 7. Each Incident Entity refers
to a more abstract entity (e.g., in Level 2 in the cyber-physical
system meta-model). For instance, incident instance sl1 which
has the type SmartLight is abstracted to an incident entity
that has type ComputingDevice. Activities of an incindent
instance can also be merged. For example, the two activities
of the incident instance model, “connect to busNetwork” and
“connect to hvac”, are abstracted to one activity, “connect to
targetCompDevice”. In this case, the precondition is set to the
precondition of the first activity (“connect to busNetwork”) in
the sequence. The postcondition is set to the postcondition of
the last activity (“connect to hvac”) in the sequence. Pre- and
post-condition of the new activity, “connect to targetCompDe-
vice” are shown in Fig. 9. The process we follow to abstract
incident instances and merge a set of subsequent activities is
described in Section V.
7Fig. 8: Mapping the system actions “connect Laptop to BusNetwork physically” and “connect ComputingDevice via
BusNetwork” to the incident instance activities “connect laptop to busNetwork” and ”connect laptop to hvac” respectively.
Fig. 9: Merging the incident instance activities ”connect laptop
to busNetwork” and ”connect laptop to hvac” into the incident
pattern activity “connect to targetCompDevice”.
V. INCIDENT PATTERN EXTRACTION
In this section we describe the technique we propose to
extract an incident pattern from an incident instance, auto-
matically. Our technique includes two steps: merging and
abstraction.
1) Merging: We map a sequence of activities in the input
incident instance to an activity pattern, which represents
an activity that is usually performed by an offender.
In our approach, we defined manually a set of activity
patterns based on the Common Attack Pattern Enumera-
tion and Classification (CAPEC) catalog [17]. CAPEC
provides more than 500 common attack patterns. An
attack pattern describes, textually, the common attributes
and approaches that an offender can exploit to harm or
weaken a target system. To create our activity patterns,
we analyze the CAPEC attack patterns and model them
as activities of the incident meta-model. We only focused
on attack patterns that could materialize in cyber-physical
systems, particularly in smart buildings. Table II shows
the name, category, and abstraction level of the attack
patterns that we used to model activity patterns. CAPEC
abstraction levels include Standard, which is a description
of an attack technique (e.g., collect data from common
resource locations 2), and Meta, which is an abstract char-
acterization of an attack technique (e.g., Excavation3).
TABLE II: Modeled CAPEC attack patterns.
Name Category Level
Collect Data from Com-
mon Resource Locations
Collect and Analyze In-
formation
Standard
Sniffing Attacks Collect and Analyze In-
formation
Standard
Content Spoofing Engage in Deceptive In-
teractions
Meta
Establish Rogue Loca-
tion
Engage in Deceptive In-
teractions
Standard
Exploitation of Trusted
Credentials
Subvert Access Control Meta
Physical Theft Subvert Access Control Meta
Using Malicious Files Subvert Access Control Standard
Functionality Bypass Abuse Existing Func-
tionality
Meta
Email Injection Inject Unexpected Items Standard
Hardware Integrity At-
tack
Manipulate System Re-
sources
Meta
A CAPEC attack pattern is characterized by a description,
an indication of its severity, a set of resources that of-
fenders require to perform the attack, some prerequisites
that should be met, and some related weaknesses that
must be present in the target system —at least one
of them— to perform the attack successfully. Weak-
nesses are usually represented using ids of relevant CWE
(Common Weakness Enumeration) vulnerabilities. For
example, Table III shows attack pattern “Collect Data
from Common Resource Locations”.
The activity we created to represent attack pattern “Col-
lect Data from Common Resource Locations” is shown
2https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/150.html
3https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/116.html
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Description
An adversary exploits well-known locations for resources for the
purposes of undermining the security of the target. Even when the
precise location of a targeted resource may not be known, naming
conventions may indicate a small area of the target machine’s
file tree where the resources are typically located. For example,
configuration files are normally stored in the /etc director on Unix
systems. Adversaries can take advantage of this to commit other
types of attacks.
Severity
Medium
Prerequisites
The targeted applications must either expect files to be located at
a specific location or, if the location of the files can be configured
by the user, the user either failed to move the files from the default
location or placed them in a conventional location for files of the
given type.
Resources Required
None
Related Weaknesses
CWE-ID: 552. Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties
in Fig. 10. To model attack patterns we first read and
examine the description of the attack pattern to identify
some keywords that allow us to define the activity initia-
tor, location, target and resource. For example, keyword
“adversary” indicates that the activity is performed by an
Actor playing the role of an offender. Keyword “target”
refers to the activity target, which in this case is a File
inside a SystemDirectory. Resources can be identified
from the the resources required and/or the description
of the attack pattern. In this example, although no re-
sources are necessary, we still considered important for
an attacker to use a computing device in order to access
a file. Thus, in our activity pattern we define a Resource
to be a ComputingDevice. Relationships between entities
can also be identified from the description of the attack
pattern. For example, we represent a containment rela-
tionship between the File and the SystemDirectory.
Second, pre- and post-condition of the activity pattern
are identified by examining the prerequisites, weaknesses,
and description of the attack pattern. The prerequisites
and weaknesses allow us to identify the precondition. In
this example, from the prerequisites, we identified that the
targeted File should be contained in the SystemDirectory.
From the weaknesses we identified, as part of the precon-
dition, that the offender should have accessibility to the
Location, which we translated as connectivity between
the offender’s ComputingDevice and the SystemDirectory.
The post-condition is inferred from the description. In this
example, we identified that the offender’s ComputingDe-
vice should contain the targeted File. Finally, the severity
of the attack pattern is assigned directly to severity of the
activity pattern. In this case, the severity of the activity
pattern is set to MEDIUM.
In addition to CAPEC attack patterns, we created pattern
activities based on common actions that occur in a
smart building such as movement between rooms, and
connectivity to a network. For example, we created an
activity pattern that expresses the activity of digitally con-
necting one’s computing device (e.g., laptop) to another
computing device (e.g., HVAC) in a system. The created
activity pattern is shown in Fig. 11. This activity pattern
allowed the merging of the two activities shown in Fig. 9.
Our extraction technique identifies sequences of activities
in an incident instance that satisfy the pre- and post-
condition of the activity patterns. A pre- or post-condition
in an activity pattern matches a pre- or post-condition
of an activity in the incident instance if the entity types
(classes) referred in the condition of the activity pattern
are (super) types of the concrete system components
referred in the incident instance. Also the pre- and post-
conditions in the activity of the incident instance should
support the same containment and connectivity relation-
ships expressed in the conditions of the activity pattern. In
other words, pre- or post-condition of an activity pattern
is converted into a Bigraph, which is then matched against
the pre- or post-condition of an activity, which is also
represented as a Bigraph. If a pre-condition of an activity
pattern is matched, then we try to find a post-condition
of an activity in the incident instance that matches the
post-condition of the pattern. If a match for the post-
condition of the activity pattern is found, then the activity
sequence, which begins from the activity that matched the
pre-condition of the activity pattern and ends with the
activity that matched the post-condition of the pattern, is
preserved for when we determine which set of activity
patterns to use for merging.
Because different activity patterns can match an overlap-
ping set of activities in an incident instance, we propose
a strategy to prioritize the activity patterns to be selected
for the matching. More precisely, we aim to maximize the
number of activity patterns that match a non overlapping
sequence of activities in an incident instance and that
have a maximum severity. We implemented the matching
as a constraint solving problem, using Choco [18]. The
sequences of activities in the incident instance matching
activity patterns are replaced by new activities. For each
activity sequence we create a new activity that has as
a pre-condition the pre-condition of the first activity in
the sequence, and as a post-condition the post-condition
of the last activity in the sequence. Unmatched activities
will remain in the incident instance sequence, however,
some of their attributes can be abstracted such as target
and location.
2) Abstraction: After merging, we replace each component
referred to in an incident actor, target, location or resource
with a more abstract representation. We define rules of
thumb to decide the level of abstraction for each system
component. Generally, we abstract a component’s type
to one level up (i.e. to a more general type) in the
system meta-model. For example, a component with type
SmartLight, level-3, is abstracted to ComputingDevice,
level-2. Similarly, we abstract a component’s Connec-
tions. For example, a BusConnection can be abstracted
to a DigitalConnection following the one-level-up rule.
In other cases, instead, we keep the same level of ab-
straction. For example a specific room (e.g., hallway)
9Fig. 10: “Collect data from common resource location” activity
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will be simply referred to as Room. Determining the
appropriate level of abstraction for different types is a
challenging task and there is no silver bullet solution.
Our rules were derived from our experience in using
our incident meta-model to represent various incidents in
smart buildings. Incident patterns can also be reviewed
by a user to adjust abstraction level, if needed. These
adjustments can be used to inform future abstractions.
Moreover, in the abstraction process of a component, its
name is changed (e.g.,“toilet” becomes “room1”). Only
selected properties of a component are included in the
abstract representation. Currently, property selection is
done manually; i.e. a user determines which properties
can be in the abstract version.
The Abstraction levels can be useful in determining which
activity patterns to apply when extracting an incident
pattern. For example, if more abstraction in an incident
pattern is required, then we can apply activity patterns
with Meta abstraction level instead of Standard. This
can be done, for example, by adding a criterion to the
constraint problem solver. This criterion can indicate that
a solution (i.e. set of selected activity patterns) should
contain more Meta activity patterns than the previous
solution.
Finally, beside abstracting the activities and entities, the
technique abstracts information provided in the Crime-
Script. In particular, the script category is changed from
INSTANCE to PATTERN.
VI. INCIDENT PATTERN INSTANTIATION
We present our automated instantiation technique to fa-
cilitate the assessment of whether and how prior incident
instances can re-occur or manifest in cyber-physical systems.
Assessment involves determining if a CPS can satisfy an
incident pattern, which is extracted from incident instances.
If so, then the technique identifies all system traces; i.e.
sequences of actions that satisfy the incident pattern activities.
Instantiation involves identifying components in a system
that match to incident pattern entities, and then identifying
Fig. 11: “connect digitally to computingDevice” activity pat-
tern.
sequences of actions in the system that satisfy the pattern
sequence of activities.
To identify system components that match to an incident
pattern entity, we define a matching criteria as follows. First,
matching type of an entity. A system component is a potential
match to an incident pattern entity if the component has
a type that is the same or less abstract than that of the
entity type. In other words, the system component should
have the same class as the entity or any of its subclasses.
For example, the incident pattern entity in Fig. 7, which
has the type ComputingDevice, has the following potential
matching components in the research center: SL1, FireAlarm,
and Server. Second, matching the type of an entity’s parent.
Similar to the first criterion, the type of a system component’s
parent should be the same or less abstract than that of
an entitys parent. Third, matching the number and type of
contained entities. In an incident pattern, the knowledge about
contained entities can be specified by EXACT or PARTIAL.
EXACT implies that a system component should contain a
number of components that is equal to that of an entity in the
incident pattern. PARTIAL implies that a system component
should have a number of components that is more than or
equal to that of an entity. Each of the contained entities
should be matched to a contained component. If knowledge is
EXACT, then all contained components should have a match
to a system component. Fourth, matching the number and
type of connections. Similar to contained entities, connections
are matched against their number and types depending on
the knowledge (i.e. EXACT or PARTIAL). Fifth, matching
attributes. If an attribute is defined in an entity, then a matching
component should possess same attribute. For example, if the
attribute status of an entity is defined to be “OPEN”, then all
matched components should have “OPEN” as a status.
If an entity has no matches, this implies that the system
does not contain components that match the specified criteria
for this entity. Therefore, the incident pattern cannot be
instantiated in the system. If all entities have matches, then
the technique generates all possible sets of system components
that map to the set of incident pattern entities. For example, an
entity of type ComputingDevice can be mapped to Research
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Center components SL1, FireAlarm, Workstation. An entity of
type Actor can be mapped to Visitor in the Research Centre.
Possible component sets for the two entities ComputingDevice,
Actor include SL1, Visitor, FireAlarm, Visitor, and Workstation,
Visitor. Possible sets can be restricted by maintaining relation-
ships found between incident pattern entities. For example, if
the entities (ComputingDevice and Actor) are contained by the
same entity (e.g., Room), then all generated sets should respect
this relationship. If FireAlarm, Visitor set does not satisfy this
containment relationship, then it will be removed from the
possible sets of components.
For each set of system components the technique identifies
states that satisfy the incident pattern activities (preconditions
& postconditions). To do so, we feed the technique a Labelled
Transitions System (LTS). This LTS is based on the system
instance model, and is generated using BigraphER. Then,
the technique identifies all states that satisfy the precondition
and postcondition of each activity. Satisfaction of a pre-/post-
condition is carried out using Bigraph matching, in which a
condition is converted into a Bigraph, then matched against a
system state. We use LibBig [19] library to perform Bigraph
matching.
After identifying all states that satisfy the conditions of the
incident pattern activities, the technique identifies traces. The
technique finds all possible traces, in which each trace contains
a sequence of states that satisfy all the activities. The first state
satisfies the precondition of the first activity, and the last state
satisfies the postcondition of the last activity. The technique
finds a trace by using a Breadth First Search (BFS) algorithm.
The algorithm identifies all non-cyclic transitions between two
states in an LTS. The technique may identify a large number of
traces that satisfy the incident pattern activities. Therefore, to
reduce the number of identified traces, the technique performs
the following. It skips traces that contain two states (e.g., A &
B) that satisfy the same condition, and state (A) has a trace to
state (B). This is done since traces from (B) will be identified
by BFS independently from (A). The technique also bounds
trace’s length.
An instantiation of the incident pattern activities, which
are shown in Fig. 7, in an LTS is shown in Fig. 12. The
instantiation identifies two correct traces that satisfy all activ-
ities. An action that satisfies an activity is denoted by a solid
arrow. The other traces are not identified as correct traces for
various reasons. First, one of the traces does not satisfy all the
activities (i.e. “send malware” is not satisfied). Second, a trace
forms a cycle (i.e. “connect to workstation” & “disconnect
from workstation” actions). An action can be a terminating
one if it is the last action in a trace and it does not satisfy the
last activity in the incident pattern, or if it forms a cycle. Third,
one trace is longer than the maximum number of actions (6
in this example) allowed for a correct trace. A trace might
contain intermediate actions i.e. actions that are irrelevant to
the satisfaction of an incident pattern such as “turn on smart
light”.
A post-instantiation analysis can be carried out. The analysis
identifies shortest traces, actions occurrences in transitions,
and shortest traces with specific action occurrence percentage
(i.e. the number of times an action appeared in the traces to
Fig. 12: An instantiation of incident pattern activities in a LTS.
the total number of traces). Shortest traces can provide some
insight about the minimum actions that can lead to an incident
in a cyber-physical system. A shortest trace would contain
at least a number of actions that is equal to the number of
activities in an incident pattern. A user could be interested in
knowing all traces that have actions with a specific occurrence
percentage (e.g., >= 90%). This can be useful in identifying
system actions that are most relevant to an incident pattern.
VII. EVALUATION
We evaluated the two automated techniques, incident pattern
extraction and instantiation via two case studies. Both case
studies are inspired by real-world systems and incidents. We
evaluated three aspects, which are:
Correctness. Does the output of each technique adhere
to our meta-models and system dynamics? In other words,
entities and relationships found in output should correspond
to entities and relationships in the meta-models, and also to
the Labeled Transition System (LTS). In the case of incident
pattern extraction, this means that the generated incident
pattern should contain only relationships and entities that
exist in the system and incident meta-models. For example, a
SmartLight should be abstracted to one of the classes defined
in the abstraction levels for it such as ComputingDevice. In
addition, the generated incident pattern should, if instantiated
in the same system in which the incident instance occurred,
regenerate the same activities found in the incident instance
model. In the case of instantiation, this means that generated
traces should correspond to traces that exist in the LTS.
Scalability. Can the techniques generate output for larger
systems? This, in particular, is relevant to the instantiation
technique since it requires identifying all possible transitions
in a LTS.
Performance. How long does it take a technique to generate
an output? For instantiation technique, this means the amount
of time it requires to identify system states that satisfy all
activities of a given incident pattern.
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A. Experimental Setup
Our evaluation was based on a real floor layout design of an
organization (here, referred to as RC1), which we had access
to. We modified the floor design by adding various smart
devices (e.g., smart lights, motion sensors, air conditioning
units) to mimic real smart building setups. After that, we
modeled RC1 using our smart building meta-model. We then
analyzed the dynamics of RC1 using Bigrapher software
tool to obtain an LTS. We generated various sizes of states
and transitions (10,000 [33,850] to 100,000 [445,028] states
[transitions]). Similarly, we modeled and analyzed another
organization (here, referred to as RC2). We developed two
incident scenarios. First scenario involves an incident instance
that occurred in RC1. The incident instance is about collecting
data transmitted over internal bus network. It consists of six
activities, which are: enter RC1, move to a room containing
access point, connect to access point, connect to bus network,
collect data transmitted, and analyze collected data. Second
scenario involves an incident pattern that is instantiated in
RC2. The incident pattern consists of three abstract activities,
which are: reach a location in smart building that contains
a device connected to internal network, gain access to the
internal network via device, and collect transmitted data.
Techniques are tested on a virtual machine that has Ubuntu
18.04.1 LTS 64bits as operating system, Intel Xeon CPU E5-
2660 2.2GHz (32 CPUs), and 64GB of memory.
B. Results
We evaluated the correctness of the extraction technique via
the first scenario, in which the technique generated an incident
pattern out of an incident instance that occurred in RC1.
Evaluation was carried out by examining and verifying that all
generated entities and activities conforms to the meta-models.
In other words, generated abstract activities should conform
to activity description in the incident meta-model and also to
activity patterns, if any is used. In addition, abstracted entities
should conform to the abstraction levels defined in the system
meta-model. We also evaluated correctness via instantiating
the generated incident pattern in the same system (i.e. RC1),
and verified that it can produce the original incident instance.
We evaluated the correctness of the instantiation technique by
examining and verifying that all generated traces contained
minimum actions for mapping the incident pattern into RC2
in the second scenario. The minimum actions were identified
manually for the incident pattern. We also verified that all
generated traces were valid; i.e. they can be identified in LTS
of RC2.
We evaluated the scalability of the extraction technique by
modifying the first scenario to include more assets and actions,
and then generated an incident pattern. The technique was
able to generate correct incident pattern. For the instantiation
technique, we applied the second scenario over various LTS
sizes; i.e. we instantiated an incident pattern in RC2 over
LTS sizes between 10,000-100,000 states. Table IV shows the
number of generated traces for different LTS sizes for RC2.
As can be noticed from Table IV, the number of generated
traces increased as LTS size increased. This can be due to
several reasons. One reason is that there are new traces in
the LTS that satisfy the incident pattern. Another reason is
the existence of traces containing the same actions that satisfy
the incident pattern, but they also contain different irrelevant
actions; i.e. actions that are not related to an incident.
To reduce traces that contain irrelevant actions, we per-
formed filtering over generated traces. Filtering is done by
mining frequent sequential patterns using the ClaSP Algo-
rithm [20]. We define frequent sequential patterns as the
shortest traces that share a maximum length partial trace.
We used an open source data mining library called SPMF4,
which provides an implementation of the ClaSP algorithm.
We filtered the generated traces as follows. We created a
functionality that reads the generated traces. Then finds all
traces that have the shortest sequence length. Following this,
it converts shortest traces into a format compatible with
SPMF. The functionality then applies the ClaSP algorithm over
converted traces. Finally, it stores results (i.e. filtered traces)
given by the algorithm. Filtered traces are shown in Table IV.
We can notice a significant reduction in the number of traces
between Generated and Filtered. This can be useful since one
can identify minimum actions in the system that can lead to
an incident. Other criteria for filtering can also be applied. For
example, filtering traces with an occurrence percentage higher
than a certain value.
We define a false positive as a trace that is generated but
does not satisfy the incident pattern. In this case, since all
traces must satisfy the incident pattern to be generated, then
there cannot be false positives. However, It can be the case that
a generated trace that satisfies the incident pattern is deemed
to be false positive. In this case, a false positive is defined as a
generated trace that does not actually form a potential incident
in the system. For this to be done, a user needs to manually
inspect a trace to determine its potential as an incident. We
define a false negative as a trace in the LTS that satisfies the
incident pattern but is not generated. False negatives can exist
in our approach in one case, that is if a trace is longer that the
set bound for identifying traces. In other words, limiting the
search for traces to a certain length implies that any trace that
satisfies the incident pattern, but has a length over the limit
will not be generated. This can be mitigated by adjusting the
length. If needed, the length can be adjusted to the maximum
trace length that a trace can have in the LTS. However, this
will impose challenges for the scalability and performance of
the approach.
We evaluated performance by measuring execution time.
Execution time means the time that the instantiation technique
required to identify all states that satisfy an incident pattern
activities. We measured the execution time of the instantia-
tion technique using different LTS sizes. The execution time
for instantiating the incident pattern activities of the second
scenario over different LTS sizes is depicted in Fig. 13.
Execution time varied depending on the LTS size. To enhance
performance, we implemented parallelism in various parts of
the instantiation technique. For example, matching system
states to activity conditions is carried out by dividing all
4http://www.philippe-fournier-viger.com/spmf/
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TABLE IV: Output of the instantiation technique applied over
different LTS sizes of RC2. Output shown is all generated
traces and relevant ones.
LTS
States Transitions Generated traces Filtered traces
10,000 33,850 720 40
20,000 73,734 2,845 90
30,000 110,569 5,403 120
40,000 158,477 10,648 160
50,000 198,771 14,777 200
60,000 252,897 23,848 240
70,000 295,160 98,720 265
80,000 349,517 143,186 305
90,000 399,319 184,269 310
100,000 445,028 216,561 340
states into subsets that are then handled by different threads.
Fig. 14 shows performance using different number of threads.
As can be noticed from Fig. 14, performance improved by
using parallelism. Execution time was almost halved using 4
threads, and reached almost quarter the original time (i.e. no
threading) using 16 threads.
C. Threats to Validity
Our results suggest that our techniques were able to produce
correct output for the scenarios in which they were tested in.
However, there are several threats, internal and external, that
may affect the interpretation and generalizability of our results.
One internal threat is that matching states to conditions
could be wrong. We use BigraphER to generate Bigraph states,
but use LibBig to match generated Bigraph states to Bigraph
conditions. This may lead to incorrect mis/matching since
different implementations of Bigraphical Reaction Systems
(BRS) may have different interpretation of BRS. To eliminate
this, we verified correctness of the matching by comparing
matching results obtained from BigraphER and that from
LibBig library. Another threat is that the implementation of
both techniques can contain bugs that may affect the output.
We made sure that this is minimized by testing each func-
tionality used by the techniques. Furthermore, we used known
algorithms in different parts of the techniques. For example,
we used shortest path algorithm to identify transitions in
Fig. 13: Execution time of incident pattern activities measured
over various LTS sizes (10K-100K states) of RC2.
Fig. 14: Execution time of instantiating incident pattern activ-
ities using different number of threads in RC2 with LTS of
size 10,000.
the instantiation technique. We also used constraint problem
solver to identify an optimized solution in the extraction
technique. A threat that is specific to the generation of trances
in the instantiation technique is bounding. Bounding trace
identification to certain length can lead to missing potential
traces that satisfy an incident pattern. This can be mitigated
by defining an adaptive bounding with a minimum value.
Bounding can change based on the number of actions in an
LTS, and also number of activities in an incident pattern. The
minimum is defined to be equal to the number of activities in
an incident pattern.
An external threat is the usefulness of generated incident
knowledge i.e. incident patterns. An organisation may decide
that an incident pattern is not abstract enough to be shared, or
it is too abstract or too detailed to be instantiated. To tackle
this, we proposed the use of CAPEC to assist in creating
incident patterns. Moreover, we intend to assess the practical
applicability of the approach to evaluate usefulness. Another
threat is the modelling of systems and incidents, which may
not correspond to real systems and incidents. To mitigate
this, system and incident models, which are used in the case
studies, are inspired from real systems and incidents. Although
we evaluated the techniques over a single floor in RC1 and
RC2, for larger systems, scalability may become an issue. This
limitation can be addressed by decomposing a smart building
into several parts (or floors) that can be then analyzed. For this,
BRS is a suitable choice since it is capable of decomposing
large systems and then analyzing them. Our techniques can
then reason about the different parts.
VIII. RELATED WORK
A number of related approaches have been proposed for
sharing incident information. Most of these approaches focus
on representing and analyzing cyber incidents. Few approaches
try to represent and analyze incidents in CPSs, and fewer
provide a way for sharing incident knowledge between CPSs.
Current attack modeling techniques (e.g., attack graphs [21])
focus on representing and analyzing how a traditional cyber
attack (e.g., denial of service) can occur. As these techniques
do not account for the interactions between cyber and physical
components, they may not be suitable to represent and analyze
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cyber-physical incidents [22]. Existing resources for incident
information are also focused on cyber incidents. For example,
the Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures (CVE) [17] is a
publically available dictionary of known cybersecurity vulner-
abilities in software and devices.
Other work, such as [23], focus on analyzing specific
attacks (e.g., switching attacks) that can occur in certain
application domain of CPSs, such as smart grids. Thus,
developed techniques cannot be applied to analyze different
types of attacks that can also happen in other application
domains. Additionally, they do not represent incident entities
(e.g., motivation) that can be useful in case an investigation
is required. Hawrylak et al. [24] propose a Hybrid Attack
Graph (HAG) to model cyber-physical attacks. Their approach
produces a graph of all possible ways a set of exploit patterns
can be applied to a system. However, the approach focuses
on representing malicious actions that exploit vulnerabilities
found in some devices and does not consider other non-
malicious interactions between cyber and physical components
that can lead to undesired state in a system.
Few approaches tackle security incident representation and
sharing. Bolle´ and Casey [25] proposed an approach to
identify and share linkages between cyber crime cases in
order to support digital investigations. The approach employs
exact and near string similarity algorithms (e.g., Levenshtein
algorithm) to identify similar digital traces between differ-
ent cyber crimes. Their current implementation focuses on
identifying similarities in email addresses. While it can be
useful to identify and share similar digital traces, the approach
focuses on cyber interactions, which may not be sufficient
for investigating incidents in CPSs. STIX (Structured Threat
Information Expression) [26] has been proposed as a language
for representing Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI). CTI is shared
using TAXII (Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence
Information) [27]. STIX provides only a representation for
CTI without any analysis of how CTI should be extracted from
one organization or how it should be instantiated in another.
Fani and Bagheri [?] proposed a light-weight security incident
ontology to represent security events. The ontology consists of
temporal, spatial, and event entities. However, their ontology
is centralized around events and do not represent other entities
that can be relevant for an investigator such as motive.
IX. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
In this paper we proposed a novel approach for representing
and sharing security incident knowledge across different orga-
nizations. We suggested that knowledge of security incidents
can be represented as incident patterns. Incident patterns are
a more abstract representation of specific incident instances.
Thus they can be applied over different cyber-physical sys-
tems. They can also avoid disclosing potentially sensitive
information about an organization’s assets and resources (e.g.,
physical structure of a building or vulnerable devices). We
also provided a representation of the system where an incident
occurs. We provided two meta-models to represent incidents
and cyber-physical systems, respectively. To obtain incident
patterns, we proposed an automated technique to extract an in-
cident pattern from a specific incident instance. To understand
how an incident pattern can manifest again in other systems,
we proposed an automated technique to instantiate incident
patterns to different systems. We demonstrated the feasibility
of our approach in the application domain of smart buildings.
We evaluated correctness, scalability, and performance using
two substantive scenarios inspired by real-world systems and
incidents.
In future work we plan to apply our approach to support
forensic readiness. Forensic readiness is the ability of a
system to proactively identify and collect data that can be
used in future investigations [28]. We intend to develop an
automated technique that analyzes the output (i.e. traces) of
the instantiation technique to identify system components and
actions that can be relevant for future investigations. We also
plan to apply our approach to various scenarios, for example,
a scenario where an incident happens across different floors,
and across smart buildings. Finally, we intend to facilitate the
modeling of security incidents and cyber-physical systems by
providing a graphical editor over our meta-models.
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